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Abstract 
As text-based computer-mediated technologies have become more and more commonplace in 
communication, our exposure to potential online deceptions like phishing, and even identity theft has also 
been increased. In order to avoid, or at least mitigate, these risks, we must be able to discern the 
underlying intent of the text message sender and to recognize whether these messages are deceptive, or 
not. The difficulty in computer-mediated communication is that we generally have only written words to 
rely on. However, prior research has demonstrated that applying certain classification methodologies to 
certain observable linguistic features can provide important clues to detecting deception with reasonable 
accuracy. This poster describes a study of an interactive online game designed and developed on Florida 
State University campus that mimics interpersonal deception scenarios. We applied different analytical 
models to the data collected as a step towards developing an automated process for detecting deception 
in online communication. 
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1 Introduction 
The use of text-based, computer-mediated communication (CMC) is ubiquitous in our society today. It has 
given us new ―tools‖ (i.e. e-mail, text/instant message, social media post) that have increased and 
enhanced the geographical scope, speed and convenience of our personal and professional 
communications. Unfortunately, while greatly facilitating communication, these same tools have also 
facilitated the variety of deceptive online communications we often learn of in the news. In short, these 
new tools have opened the door to new troubles—including exposing users to new and/or increased risks 
in terms of online safety, security and privacy. Assuming text-based CMC will remain a fixture in the 
communication landscape for the foreseeable future, a key question to address is how to identify and 
avoid (or at least mitigate) these risks. This requires an understanding of how we evaluate and assess the 
truthfulness and trustworthiness of an individual with whom we are communicating online—both in terms 
of assessing his/her identity, and the information exchanged. This, in turn, requires an understanding of 
the fundamental nature of deception and deceptive communication. 
One of the fundamental truths about deception is that, in general, people are bad at detecting it 
(Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991). Moreover, although previous research has demonstrated that it is possible to 
detect deception in CMC with reasonable accuracy through certain observable linguistic features and 
cues, there has been comparatively little about how to ―translate‖ these features and cues into an 
algorithm or code for a program that could automatically ―flag‖ them for the user to inform his/her 
assessment. This paper attempts to address the foundational research question: Can we computationally 
capture a liar? 
In the following sections, we will first highlight some truths about deception. Then, we will briefly 
discuss our research design and data is captured, along with an analysis of the findings. Finally, we will 
conclude by answering our research question, and outline our potential future work. 
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2 Deception – In Theory:  Our Theoretical Foundation 
Beyond the fact that people are poor deception detectors, there are additional truths about deceptive 
communication that must be understood. First, deception is a relatively common occurrence, with at least 
one quarter of all communications being deceptive to some extent (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Second, 
deception has generally been defined as ―a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false 
belief or conclusion by the receiver‖ (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 205). It should therefore be understood 
as a volitional, intentional act; mistakes or unintentional misstatements of fact do not constitute deception. 
Further, as suggested by Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), deception is akin to a game of chess: it is 
an iterative and strategic process on the part of all parties, wherein one party’s behaviors influence or 
affect the responsive behaviors of the other throughout the exchange (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). From this 
perspective, deceptive communication can be understood to involve and implement the persuasive 
strategies employed by the sender to deliberately distort the message s/he wants to convey and thereby 
influence ―the beliefs, attitudes and behaviors...‖ of the receiver (Miller et al., 1983, p. 99). 
Our ability to detect deception, whether in CMC or face-to-face (F2F) communication, depends on 
numerous factors, especially the availability of clues and cues to the receiver with which s/he can assess 
and evaluate the sender. These cues can be physical (i.e. body language, facial expression) (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969), verbal (i.e. words—written or spoken) (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; 
DePaulo et al., 2003), or both. The main problem with detecting deception in CMC is that the physical 
cues present in F2F communication are absent in CMC, so the receiver must rely almost entirely on just 
the sender’s words (i.e. verbal cues) in his/her assessment. In addition, the availability of other verbal and 
non-verbal cues/ clues is also reduced in CMC as against F2F communication. However, both IDT and 
social distance theory (DePaulo et al., 1996), suggest there are nonetheless certain ―language-action 
cues‖—that is, the linguistic style, phrases and patterns in an actor’s written expression (Ho et al., 2015a; 
Ho et al., 2016a; Ho et al., 2016b; Ho et al., 2015b)—that can still be observed and can reveal deceptive 
intent in CMC. Essentially, it has been shown that a speaker’s usage of words is indicative of behavioral 
intent (i.e. deceptive or non-deceptive) (Zhou & Zhang, 2008). Among the non-verbal, syntactical cues 
that have been studied are overall conciseness (vs. wordiness) and the internal consistency of detail in 
the communication (Zhou & Zhang, 2004; Zhou et al., 2003), and our own study specifically considers 
latency or time-lag (the length of time between one communicating partner asking a question and the 
other responding to it). Examples of some of the various verbal language-action cues are noted in Table 1 
below.  IDT in particular emphasizes both verbal and non-verbal language-action cues, positing that such 
cues in a deceiver’s message reflect his/her strategic attempts to manipulate information and shape 
behavior (Burgoon et al., 1996). Social distance theory also emphasizes these cues, suggesting that, in 
order to avoid the social discomfort associated with lying, deceivers will separate or distance themselves 
from the person to whom they are lying and, accordingly, their language-action cues will reflect this 
(DePaulo et al., 1996). 
3 Deception – In Practice:  Our Study 
We designed and developed an interactive online game (―Real or Spiel‖), hosted on Google+ Hangout, 
that simulates a real-time interactive deception scenario through synchronous communication channels 
(specifically, text-chat) (Figure 1). Each game involves two players, who are placed in assigned pairings by 
the research team, and are then randomly assigned an outer role as either a speaker or a detector in each 
scenario. The speaker in each scenario is also randomly assigned an inner role—either saint (truthful) or 
sinner (deceptive). The speaker establishes the ground truth at the beginning of each scenario by truthfully 
answering the underlying question for that scenario. The detector then asks probing questions to derive an 
answer to this underlying scenario question. The speaker answers these questions based on his/her 
assigned inner role, and then at the end of the scenario the detector tries to determine whether or not the 
speaker was being deceptive or truthful based on his/her responses. 
3.1 Data Collection 
We collected data starting in Fall 2014 through Spring 2015. In total, forty participants were recruited and 
randomly paired to play twenty game sessions. Each session lasted approximately thirty minutes. Data 
from each game scenario/ chat exchange were collected and stored in the game system’s MySQL 
database. Before processing the data, we corrected all spelling errors, spelled out all abbreviations, 
acronyms and chat terms in full, and ensured player role/scenario alignment. Once the data were cleaned 
and validated, we had 2,196 lines of text and a total word count of 7,271 in the final dataset that was 
processed using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) analysis (Table 1). 
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Figure 1. Online Game Interface 
 
Table 1.  LIWC Categories Used In Analysis 
3.2 Machine Learning Deception 
The extracted data was further analyzed using several different approaches to assess the types of 
cues appeared to have the greatest predictive value for detecting deception. Ho et al. (2016b) reported 
the order of language-action cues in which they were found to be significant in predicting truthful versus 
deceptive statements. 
We further developed a number of models to examine the predictive power of language-action cues/ 
indicators in different combinations. Although the output of each modeling approach demonstrated that 
the cues we investigated had at least some predictive value, we found support-vector machine (SVM) 
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analysis generated some particularly intriguing results. We created SVM models using RBF (radial basis 
function) kernels, which are able to provide particularly high accuracy because the support vector 
machine parameters can be fine-tuned in RBF kernel modeling. Figure 2 illustrates a two-dimensional 
view of the SVM RBF kernel; this model yielded a decision boundary accuracy of 98%—which is to say 
that this model, using two predictors (I/ time-lag and insight/time-lag), predicts deception accurately 98% 
of the time. Figure 3 illustrates a more complex, three-dimensional view of the SVM RBF kernel, 
combining all three variables, which also yielded a decision boundary accuracy of 98%. It should be noted 
that we report on combinations of only three of the eighteen indicators we studied (see Table 1), and that 
the specific cues used in the analyses depicted below were selected more-or-less randomly, for purposes 
of illustrating our approach. The same approach could be used with any combination of two or three cues 
from the list, although, of course, different combinations of variables will yield different levels of accuracy. 
It should also be noted that our data were essentially the initial training data, and have thus not yet been 
cross-validated by further data collection. Nonetheless, this provides a good picture of the results 
generated, and the type of modeling approach we applied. 
 
  
Figure 2. 2D SVM RBF kernel with 98% accuracy 
 
Figure 3. 3D SVM RBF kernel with 98% accuracy 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that we can respond to our research question in the 
affirmative: ―Yes‖ it is possible to computationally capture a liar. Our ultimate objective is to be able to use 
these results to derive an algorithm or code that can be used to develop an automated process or system 
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for deception detection. To this end, our future work will focus on fine-tuning the game design to capture 
some additional data points—including not only ensuring that the detector’s final ―guess‖ as to the 
speaker’s role is captured, but also gathering data from him/her as to what specific thing(s) in the chat/ 
exchange led him/her to make that particular guess. 
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